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Personal Interest — Drone Warfare Ethics

Military Drones and the Ethics of Remote Warfare

Teagan Milar

University of Cincinnati

Personal Interest

10-20-2026

Military Drones and the Ethics of Remote Warfare

A military drone can put thousands of miles between the person who authorizes a strike and the people who live with its consequences. That distance can save a pilot’s life. It can also make a decision to use lethal force look more straightforward than it is. A crew can watch someone on a screen without knowing why that person is there or who else might be nearby. The ethical question is what human beings owe one another when they make decisions about killing in war. The United States has good reasons to develop military drones as other countries adopt them and as the character of warfare changes. It should preserve that capability while requiring an identifiable person to make and explain the decision to use lethal force against another human being. That requirement matters for the people on the ground and for a public that may find remote warfare easier to accept.

Distance and the Decision to Kill

There is something unsettling about one person being able to kill another from a place of relative safety. Still, requiring a pilot to be physically present would be a strange way to honor the value of human life. Military leaders have a responsibility to protect their personnel when they can, and putting a pilot in danger does nothing by itself to make an attack more just. Distance can sometimes give a crew time to observe, question its assumptions, and call off a strike. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, 2025) notes that whether drones reduce civilian harm depends partly on the quality of the information available to operators and the circumstances in which the aircraft is used.

The dehumanizing part of remote warfare is the ease with which a partial view of someone can become the basis for a final decision about that person. A screen can show a vehicle stopping outside a building. It cannot, on its own, explain why the driver stopped there or who is inside. A crew may see every movement clearly and still misunderstand what it means. This is where the distinction between precision and judgment matters. A weapon can hit the exact place it was directed to hit while the decision to strike that place is wrong. Under the laws of armed conflict, armed drone operations are subject to rules that require distinguishing lawful targets from civilians and civilian objects, prohibit attacks expected to cause excessive civilian harm relative to the anticipated military advantage, and require feasible precautions to reduce harm (ICRC, 2025). Applying those rules takes judgment about what the image actually shows and what remains unknown.

The Costs People on the Ground Carry

Civilian casualties are an essential measure of a war’s cost, but a casualty count leaves out much of what it is like to live where strikes occur. A 2012 report by law school clinics at Stanford University and New York University documented how residents interviewed about U.S. drone operations in Pakistan described living with fear and uncertainty. Accounts included anxiety about everyday gatherings and the possibility that an ordinary activity might put people at risk (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic & Global Justice Clinic, 2012). Those interviews concern a particular campaign and cannot tell us how common these experiences are across conflicts. They do show why an assessment based only on people killed or injured on the day of a strike can miss effects that shape daily life long afterward.

The public at home may see even less of those effects. When a government can use force with little immediate danger to its own personnel, one of the costs that Americans are most likely to notice becomes less visible. Public support can also turn on what Americans learn about the people harmed. In survey experiments, Walsh (2015) found that respondents were less tolerant of civilian deaths when an attack was described as using precision weapons than when it was described as using other weapons, even with the same reported outcome. The promise of precision may raise the public’s expectations about civilian protection. That gives officials a reason to make civilian harm findings available so the public can judge whether operations live up to those expectations. Some operational information understandably has to remain confidential. Governments can still explain the legal basis for campaigns, disclose what they can about civilian harm, and acknowledge when investigations find mistakes. Otherwise, the people who bear the greatest risk can have the least influence over how that risk is understood.

Military Power in a Changing War

A serious argument about drone ethics has to take military competition seriously. The United States cannot decide whether other countries develop uncrewed systems. It can decide whether its own forces are prepared for conflicts in which those systems are common. Drones can perform surveillance without exposing a crew to the same danger as a crewed flight. They also give military leaders options in situations where sending personnel would carry substantial risks. In 2024, the U.S. Department of Defense announced the first set of capabilities selected for accelerated fielding under Replicator, an initiative focused on uncrewed autonomous systems designed with the expectation that some could be lost in use (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024). The announcement illustrates how military planning has moved beyond treating uncrewed systems as specialized equipment for a narrow set of missions.

Maintaining a strong military gives the United States a reason to invest in this technology. It does not settle when using lethal force is justified. Those are different decisions, and confusing them makes it easy to treat a capability as something that ought to be used simply because it is available. Rules governing how force is authorized can preserve the advantages of drones while making it harder to resort to strikes on weak evidence. This matters strategically as well as ethically. A strike can remove a threat and still damage trust if a community experiences the attack as arbitrary and receives no credible explanation afterward. Counting only what a strike accomplished in the moment gives an incomplete picture of whether it served a broader military objective.

Keeping Human Responsibility Meaningful

A remotely piloted aircraft can automate parts of its flight while a human still decides whether to use force. A weapon that independently selects and engages a target raises a further ethical concern because a person may authorize its operation without deciding that a particular person should be attacked. The Department of Defense’s Directive 3000.09 requires autonomous and semiautonomous weapons to be designed to allow appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023). The ICRC (2021) takes a stricter position and calls for prohibiting autonomous weapons designed or used to apply force against people. The difference matters because a general requirement for human judgment leaves room for disagreement about which decisions a person must make and when.

A human approval step only matters if the person has the information, time, and authority to say no. Someone who is expected to approve a system’s recommendation within seconds may have little real ability to challenge it. For an attack directed at a person, a human decision-maker should be able to explain what made the person a lawful target, what was known about possible harm to civilians, and why proceeding was justified at the time. The military should also record who made the decision and investigate credible reports of harm. That record gives reviewers a chance to determine whether the problem was a mistaken assumption, inadequate information, or a decision to proceed despite serious uncertainty. It also keeps responsibility from disappearing among the people who designed the system, the people who supplied the information, and the people who authorized the attack.

Conclusion

Drones will remain part of military planning because they can protect personnel and because other armed forces are investing in them. The United States has more control over the terms on which it uses these systems than it has over the direction of military technology worldwide. It can invest in uncrewed aircraft while insisting that decisions to attack people remain traceable to officials who can explain and defend them. The distance between a crew and the people on the ground may be unavoidable in a particular operation. Allowing that distance to weaken the obligation to question a strike, recognize civilian harm, or answer for a mistake is a choice.

References

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2021, May 12). ICRC position on autonomous weapon systems. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-position-autonomous-weapon-systems

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2025, December 10). Frequently asked questions: International humanitarian law and the use of drones in armed conflict. https://www.icrc.org/en/article/faq-international-humanitarian-law-drones-armed-conflict

International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic & Global Justice Clinic. (2012, September). Living under drones: Death, injury, and trauma to civilians from US drone practices in Pakistan. Stanford Law School & NYU School of Law. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Stanford_NYU_LIVING_UNDER_DRONES.pdf

U.S. Department of Defense. (2023, January 25). Autonomy in weapon systems (DoD Directive 3000.09). https://media.defense.gov/2023/jan/25/2003149928/-1/-1/0/dod-directive-3000.09-autonomy-in-weapon-systems.pdf

U.S. Department of Defense. (2024, May 6). Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks announces first tranche of Replicator capabilities focused on all domain attritable autonomous systems [Press release]. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3765644/deputy-secretary-of-defense-hicks-announces-first-tranche-of-replicator-capabil/

Walsh, J. I. (2015). Precision weapons, civilian casualties, and support for the use of force. Political Psychology, 36(5), 507–523. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12175